<15>In its opinion below, the Court of Appeals similarly considered the arbitration provisions in this case to be illusory. Cordova, No. 27,436, slip op. at 3. Unlike the contracts in Piano and Heye, however, the arbitration provisions at issue here were not capable of being modified by World Finance after the fact. They were one-sided from the beginning.
<16>Because World Finance did not reserve the unilateral right to modify or eliminate any of its contractual obligations, and because consideration was provided in the new extensions of credit that accompanied each of the questioned arbitration agreements, we agree with the position of World Finance that this case does not fit within the Piano and Heye analytical framework. We have concluded that the most appropriate way in which to evaluate these agreements is through the framework of a traditional unconscionability analysis, as urged by Cordova and by amici curiae AARP and the Attorney General of New Mexico.
<17>World Finance contends that the unconscionability issue has not been properly presented and preserved, and is therefore not before us for consideration. We disagree. To support Cordova’s arguments in the district court that «World Finance Company’s arbitration agreement is so one-sided that it cannot be enforced,» Cordova did not rely solely on the void-as-illusory contract precedents of Piano and Heye. See Brown v. Tenn. , 216 S.W.3d 780 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Wis. Auto v. Jones, 714 N.W.2d 155 (Wis. 2006). The district court ruled in favor of Cordova without stating the basis for its order. In the Court of Appeals, this case was disposed of with a memorandum opinion on the basis of World Finance’s docketing statement and memorandum in opposition to summary affirmance, without opportunity for Cordova to submit further briefing. Cordova therefore has not abandoned the preserved issue of unconscionability.
Cordova’s guidance especially made use of, and provided duplicates away from, reported viewpoints hitting off equivalent one to-sided small-lender arbitration clauses to the a direct unconscionability theory
<18>Even if the issue had not been preserved below, it is established law that our appellate courts will affirm a district court’s decision if it is right for any reason, so long as the circumstances do not make it unfair to the appellant to affirm. State v. Gallegos, 2007-NMSC-007, ¶ 26, 141 N.M. 185, 152 P.3d 828; see State v. Vargas, 2008-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 143 N.M. 692, 181 P.3d 684 («Under the ?right for any reason’ doctrine, ?we may affirm the district court’s order on grounds not relied upon by the district court if those grounds do not require us to look beyond the factual allegations that were raised and considered below.'» (citation omitted)). «Generally, an appellee has no duty to preserve issues for review and may advance any ground for affirmance on appeal.» State v. Todisco, 2000-NMCA-064, ¶ 11, 129 N.M. 310, 6 P.3d 1032 (citation omitted). The factual allegations that are addressed in this opinion are the factual allegations that have been the basis of all the litigation throughout the course of this case.
Term Funds, Inc
<19>It is not unfair to World Finance for us to address a central issue in these circumstances, one which World Finance has had ample opportunities to address and has in fact addressed. Unconscionability was the primary focus of all of the appellate briefs of Cordova and amici, and World Finance’s able counsel availed themselves of the opportunity to file replies to each one of those briefs, albeit while objecting to consideration of the issue by this Court. Unconscionability was a central focus of the oral arguments in this case. There is no principled reason why it should not be addressed and resolved by this Court.